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Utah Court of Appeals 
p E B 2 6 1993 
Clerk of the Court 
Re: Kent L. Brown and Larry R. Hendricks. Plaintiffs and 
Appellants v. Roy B. Moore; Elaine B. Weis; The Department of 
Financial Institutions of Utah. Defendants and Appellees 
Case No. 920703-CA (Third District Case No. C87-7906) 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Pursuant to Rule 25(j) Appellees hereby advise the Court 
of supplemental authority entitled Prows v. State. 822 P.2d 764 
(Utah 1991). Prows was cited in Appellant's Reply Brief for its 
background facts regarding the thrift crisis in 1986. In Prows the 
owners of Foothill Financial sued the Department of Financial 
Institutions of the State of Utah after it took possession of 
Foothill Financial. Prows is the third relatively recent case 
where the supreme court has upheld summary judgment or dismissal on 
behalf of the Department of Financial Institutions in cases brought 
by owners or shareholders of a failing thrift. See Appellees' 
Brief, pp. 17-2 0, where they cite the other two cases. 
Although Prows can be distinguished from this case 
because Prows contracted with the ILGC and not the Department of 
Financial Institutions and the ILGC, the Prows decision does apply 
to this case in at least three ways: 
(1) Sophisticated purchasers are chargeable with notice 
of statutes. Prows at 769. See Appellees' Brief at pp. 15, 16 
where Appellees argue that Brown and Hendricks knew Western would 
be regulated by the Department of Financial Institutions pursuant 
to statutes. See also Facts 1 and 2 in Appellees' Brief showing 
the sophistication of Brown and Hendricks. 
(2) Duties imposed by law are insufficient consideration 
to support a contract. Prows at 768. See Fact 7 in Appellees' 
Brief at p. 9, stating that because Western was a "failing 
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Utah Court of Appeals 
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depository institution," as defined by the statute, the 
Commissioner was empowered to require Western to enter an agreement 
to transfer its control to Brown and Hendricks. Also, see pp. 12-
20 of Appellees' Brief where Appellees argue that the Department's 
only obligation under the contract with Hendricks and Brown was a 
statutory obligation to transfer stock. 
(3) The appropriate place to resolve liability of the 
ILGC was a proceeding liquidating the ILGC. Prows, at 768. 
Likewise, in Appellees' Brief at p. 20, 21, Appellees argue that 
Brown and Hendricks must seek reimbursement for themselves out of 
the proceeds from the liquidation of Western. In liquidation, 
Brown and Hendricks are paid a residual after creditors are paid in 
order of priority according to the law. Appellees' Brief at p. 23. 
I enclose an original and seven copies of this letter to 
be filed with the Utah Court of Appeals, and I have mailed, this 
day, a copy to counsel for Appellants, Mr. John Mangum. I also 





cc: John Mangum, Esq. (w/encls.) 
Edward O. Ogilvie, Esq.(w/encls.) 
EN & POWELL, P.C. 
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Richard S. PROWS and Robert W. Wood, 
individuals, and Foothill Federated 
Corporation, a Utah corporation, Plain-
tiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
The STATE of Utah, the Department of 
Financial Institutions of the State of 
Utah, and Industrial Loan Guaranty 
Corporation, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 890161. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 5, 1991. 
Rehearing Denied Dec. 5, 1991. 
Purchasers of industrial loan corpora-
tion brought action against the State, the 
Department of Financial Institutions, and 
the Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation 
(ILGC) for breach of contract, statutory 
entitlement and promissory estoppel for 
failure to pay the full amount of guaran-
teed deposits. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, David S. Young, J., 
granted motion to dismiss. Purchasers ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., 
held that: (1) an alter ego theory could not 
be used to obtain a greater recovery from 
the State than would have been available 
under the statutes governing the ILGC; (2) 
there was no consideration to support an 
alleged contract under which the ILGC 
would pay $15,000 per deposit account 
where both parties merely performed statu-
tory obligations; (3) the statute governing 
the guaranty of depositors' funds limits the 
liability of the ILGC to its available funds; 
and (4) the purchasers' allegations did not 
fall within any exception to the general 
rule that estoppel could not be asserted 
against the government. 
Affirmed. 
1. States <s=>208 
Complaint filed by purchasers of indus-
trial loan corporation adequately alleged 
claim that State was alter ego of Industrial 
Loan Guaranty Corporation (ILGC), even 
though complaint did not include detailed 
factual allegations; under notice pleads 
requirements, complaint adequately alWed 
that it would be inequitable to allow State 
after dominating and controlling ILGC to 
be protected from suit by being treated as 
separate entity.^ U.C.A.1953, 7-8a-l to 7-
8a-22; Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 8. 
2. States <s=>212 
Even if State could be treated as alter 
ego of Industrial Loan Guaranty Corpora-
tion (ILGC), purchasers of industrial loan 
corporation could not receive greater recov-
ery from State than that available from 
ILGC under breach of contract theory aris-
ing out of failure to guaranty deposits. 
U.C.A.1953, 7-8a-8, 7-8a-13(l). 
3. Consumer Credit <s=>4 
Industrial loan corporation's payment 
of statutory assessments to Industrial 
Loan Guaranty Corporation (ILGC) could 
not be "consideration" sufficient to support 
alleged contract to guaranty deposits in 
corporation up to $15,000 per depositor; 
each party's act was undertaken pursuant 
to statute. U.C.A.1953, 7-8a-8, 7-8a-13(l). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Consumer Credit <s=>4 
Industrial Loan Guaranty Corpora-
tion's (ILGC's) statutory obligation to guar-
anty deposits was subject to ratable reduc-
tion for whatever deficiency existed in 
funds available to ILGC; ILGC's liability 
was limited to its available funds. 
U.C.A.1953, 7-8a-8, 7-8a-13(l). 
5. Consumer Credit <3=*4 * / 
Statutory limitation of Industrial Loan 
Guaranty Corporation's (ILGC's) liability 
for guaranty of depositors' funds was to be 
resolved in proceedings for liquidation of 
ILGC, not in court. U.C.A.1953, 7-8a-8, 7-
8a-13(l). 
6. Consumer Credit ®=>4 
Claim under Industrial Loan Corpora-
tion Guaranty Act (ILCGA) provision guar-
anteeing depositors' funds should be made 
directly against State, not against Industri-
al Loan Guaranty Corporation (ILGC) as 
PROWS 
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means of asserting alter ego claim against 
State. U.C.A.1953, 7-8a-8. 
7. Estoppel <3=*85 
Elements of promissory estoppel are 
promise that promisor reasonably expects 
r^ill induce reliance, reasonable reliance in-
ducing action or forebearance by promisee 
or third person, and detriment to promisee 
o r third person. 
8. Estoppel <3=*62.1 
Generally, party may not assert estop-
pel against the government. 
9. Estoppel <3=>62.2(2) 
Claim by purchasers of industrial loan 
corporation that Department of Financial 
Institutions (DFI) and its commissioner 
made representations that deposits would 
be unconditionally insured up to $15,000 
per depositor did not fall within exception 
to general rule barring assertion of estop-
pel against the government; any state-
ments made by DFI or commissioner di-
rectly contravened statutes limiting liabili-
ty of Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation 
(ILGC) to its available funds, and sophis-
ticated purchasers were chargeable with 
notice of statutes. U.C.A.1953, 7-8a-8/T-
8a-13(l). 
Dennis K. Poole, Duane R. Smith, J. 
Frederic Voros, Jr., Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs and appellants. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Stephen J. Sorenson, 
Bryce H. Pettey, Ray R. Christensen, Jay 
E. Jensen, Salt Lake City, for the State of 
Utah and the Dept of Financial Institu-
tions. 
P. Keith Nelson, David L. Barclay, Salt 
Lake City, for Indus. Loan Guar. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Richard S. Prows, Robert W. Wood, and 
Foothill Federated Corporation (collectively 
"Foothill Federated" or "plaintiffs") appeal 
from the trial court's order dismissing their 
amended complaint as to defendants Utah 
Department of Financial Institutions 
!• Foothill also named as a defendant the Indus-
trial Loan Guaranty Corporation. The claims 
v. STATE Utah 765 
764 (Utah 1991) 
("DFI") and the State of Utah (collectively 
"the State").1 The amended complaint 
sought recovery from the State for losses 
plaintiffs suffered when Foothill Federated 
Corporation was unable to continue operat-
ing as a financial institution. We affirm 
the trial court's dismissal of the amended 
complaint. 
In its present form, the Industrial Loan 
Corporation Guaranty Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 7-8a-l to -22, creates the Industrial 
Loan Guaranty Corporation ("ILGC"), a 
private nonprofit corporation intended to 
guarantee thrift deposits until those depos-
its become federally insured. Utah Code 
Ann. § 7-8a-2. Pursuant to that Act, all 
industrial loan corporations which are not 
insured by the federal government and 
have outstanding thrift certificates of de-
posit or thrift savings accounts are mem-
bers of the ILGC. Utah Code Ann. § 7-
8a-6. Those members must participate in 
the ILGC by paying assessments in 
amounts the statute specifies. Utah Code 
Ann. § 7-8a-10. The statute limits the 
maximum amount of funds guaranteed per 
depositor to 515,000. Utah Code Ann. § 7-
8a-8. 
Plaintiffs Prows and Wood, acting as 
Foothill Federated Corporation, acquired 
Foothill Thrift and Loan, a Utah industrial 
loan corporation, on December 29, 1985, 
after Elaine Weis, acting in her capacity as 
the commissioner of financial institutions, 
entered an order approving their applica-
tion. Plaintiffs changed the name of the 
institution to Foothill Financial and recapi-
talized it in the approximate amount of $5 
million. 
The DFI granted plaintiffs a state char-
ter when they acquired Foothill Financial. 
The institution was not federally insured. 
As a result, plaintiffs became statutorily 
obligated to participate in the ILGC by 
paying the required assessments. In July 
of 1986, Weis and the DFI declared the 
ILGC insolvent and, after declaring numer-
ous Utah thrifts insolvent, seized those 
thrifts' assets. On April 3 and 4, 1987, 
Foothill Financial suffered a run on its 
against the ILGC, however, were stayed by a 
separate proceeding liquidating that entity. 
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deposits, forcing it to close its doors. The 
run was allegedly started by a television 
news report that Foothill Financial deposits 
were without any state or federal deposit 
insurance.2 
On April 4, 1987, Weis and the DFI 
seized Foothill Financial. Thereafter, 
Zions First National Bank acquired the as-
sets of Foothill Financial and Foothill Fed-
erated, conditioned on an agreement by 
Prows and Wood (and other entities they 
owned) to indemnify Zions against potennal 
losses and refrain from participating in any 
profits generated by the assets. At the 
time of the transaction, Foothill Financial 
deposits totalled approximately S27 million. 
Due to the loss of Foothill Financial and 
the indemnification granted to Zions, 
Prows and Wood now claim that they sus-
tained a loss of approximately $9 million. 
Plaintiffs sued the ILGC, the DFI, and 
the State of Utah for these losses, claiming 
breach of contract, statutory entitlement, 
and promissory estoppel. Essentially, 
plaintiffs argue that the ILGC promised to 
guarantee Foothill Financial deposits, the 
ILGC breached its promise by failing to 
perform on the guaranties, the State was 
the ILGC's alter ego (because of the rela-
tionship of Elaine Weis and the DFI with 
the ILGC), and thus the State is answera-
ble for the ILGC's breach. In addition, 
plaintiffs seek to estop the State from de-
nying representations and promises that 
led plaintiffs to believe that the obligations 
of the ILGC were guaranteed by the State. 
The district court granted defendants' 
motion to dismiss, citing the following 
grounds: (1) defendants are immune from 
suit under subsections 63-30-10(l)(a), (c), 
(d), and (f) of the Utah Governmental Im-
munity Act; (2) defendants have no duty of 
care toward plaintiffs upon which tort lia-
bility could be predicated; (3) based upon 
the allegations set forth in the amended 
complaint, the State is not the alter ego of 
the ILGC; and (4) defendants are immune 
from suit under section 7-8a-20(3) of the 
ILGC Act. Although none of these 
2. Although Foothill had been conditionally ap-
proved for FDIC insurance, that insurance uas 
grounds directly address plaintiffs' con-
tract claims, we affirm the trial court's 
dismissal of the complaint. 
Three issues are before us on appeal: 
first, whether the trial court properly ruled 
as a matter of law that the State could not 
be the alter ego of the ILGC, second, 
whether it is clear that plaintiffs are not 
entitled to relief on their breach of con-
tract, statutory entitlement, and promisso-
ry estoppel claims, and third, whether the 
State is immune from these claims under 
the Governmental Immunity Act or under 
section 7-8a-20(3) of the ILGC Act. Be-
cause of the nature of our resolution of 
Dlamtiffs' alter ego, statutory entitlement, 
oreach of contract, and promissory estop-
pel claims, we need not address the State's 
governmental immunity defenses 
I STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case comes to us as an appeal from 
a dismissal under Utah Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 12(b)(6) A motion to dismiss is appro-
priate only where it clearly appears that 
the plaintiff or plaintiffs would not be enti-
tled to relief under the facts alleged or 
under any state of facts they could prove 
to support their claim. Colman v Utah 
State Land Bd, 795 P 2d 622, 624 (Utah 
1990) In determining whether the trial 
court properly granted the motion, we 
must accept the factual allegations in the 
complaint as true and consider all reason-
able inferences to be drawn from those 
facts m a light most fa\ orable to the plain-
tiff. St. Benedict's Dev Co v St Bene-
dict's Hospital, 811 P2d 194 (Utah 1991) 
II. ALTER EGO 
Plaintiffs assert breach of contract, stat-
utory entitlement, and promissory estoppel 
claims in then- amended complaint. Recov-
ery on the breach of contract and statutory 
entitlement claims depends on a favorable 
resolution of the alter ego claim. Under 
the latter, plaintiffs assert that the ILGC 
entered into a contract with Foothill Finan-
not yet in place 
PROWS 
Cite as 822 V2d 
- 1 and Foothill Financial's depositors, that 
the contract was subsequently breached, 
nd that because the State was the alter 
Igo of the ILGC, the State and the ILGC 
^e both liable for the breach. 
n ] There are two requirements for 
proof of alter ego. First, " 'there must be 
such a unity of interest and ownership that 
the separate personalities of the corpora-
tion[s] . . . no longer exist*" Municipal 
Bldg. Auth. of Iron County v. Lowder, 711 
P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1985) (quoting Nor-
man v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 
596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979)). Second, 
the court's observance of the corporate 
form must " 'sanction a fraud, promote in-
justice, or [cause] an inequitable re-
sult. .. Id. 
The amended complaint alleges, "Al-
though the ILGC was created by statute as 
a private nonprofit corporation, by 1985 the 
DFI and Elaine Weis . . . so dominated and 
controlled the ILGC that it no longer had 
any separate existence but had become the 
alter ego of the State of Utah." The com-
plaint also alleges that it would be ineq-
uitable to allow the State of Utah, after 
dominating and controlling the ILGC, to be 
protected from suit by considering the 
State and the ILGC as separate entities. 
The complaint does not include detailed fac-
tual allegations supporting plaintiffs' alter 
ego theory, but under Utah's notice plead-
ing requirements, the foregoing adequately 
asserts a claim and puts the State on notice 
of that claim. See generally Utah R.Civ.P. 
8; Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 
668-69 (Utah 1985). 
[2] Plaintiffs apparently are relying on 
an alter ego theory as a means of achieving 
a greater recovery from the State than that 
available from the ILGC. There is a funda-
mental flaw, however, in this reliance. 
Even if we allow application of an alter ego 
theory in this instance, and even if plain-
tiffs could prove this theory at trial, as the 
alter ego of the ILGC, the State would be 
liable only to the same extent that the 
ILGC is liable. While section 7-8a-8 limits 
liability to $15,000 for each depositor, sec-
tion 7-8a-13(l) places a limit on the liability 
of the ILGC. The latter section provides in 
v. STATE Utah 767 
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part, "If the total funds available from the 
guaranty corporation at that time are in-
sufficient to pay in full the amounts provid-
ed by § 7-8a-8, the amount paid to each 
account holder shall be ratably reduced in 
proportion to the amount by which the 
fund is deficient." Plaintiffs allege in their 
amended complaint that they entered into a 
contract with the ILGC in which the ILGC 
agreed "to guarantee Foothill's deposits at 
statutorily mandated levels." (Emphasis 
added.) Because the terms of such a con-
tract would necessarily include the limita-
tion of liability imposed by the statute, 
plaintiffs cannot place themselves in a bet-
ter position by attempting to hold the 
State, as the ILGC's alter ego, liable under 
the same contract. 
III. BREACH OF CONTRACT, STATU-
TORY ENTITLEMENT, AND PROM-
ISSORY ESTOPPEL CLAIMS 
In the order dismissing plaintiffs' com-
plaint, the court found that (1) defendants 
are immune from suit under the Utah Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 6S-3(M0(l)(a), (c), (d), and (f); (2) defen-
dants owe no duty of care toward plaintiffs 
upon which to base tort liability; (3) based 
upon the allegations set forth in the amend-
ed complaint, defendants are not the alter 
ego of the ILGC; and (4) defendants are 
immune from suit under section 7-8a-20(3) 
of the ILGC Act. We affirm the trial 
court's conclusions, although on different 
grounds than those articulated by that 
court. 
[3] The threshold issue we must ad-
dress is whether plaintiffs have stated a 
claim upon which relief can be granted. 
The only contract claim alleged in the 
amended complaint asserts, ''Plaintiff 
Foothill Federated thus entered into a con-
tract with the ILGC to pay statutorily 
required assessments in exchange for the 
ILGC's agreement to guarantee Foothill 
Financial's deposits at statutorily mandated 
levels." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the only 
contract plaintiffs allege is a bilateral con-
tract between Foothill Federated and the 
ILGC. Plaintiffs did not bargain for a 
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promise from the ILGC to guarantee de-
posits, however, nor did they pay the as-
sessments in exchange for an act by the 
ILGC. Neither party's act mduced the oth-
er's action. On the contrary, plaintiffs con-
cede that each party's act was undertaken 
pursuant to statute, based upon an existing 
legal obligation. 
It is well recognized that the perform-
ance of a duty imposed by law is insuffi-
cient consideration to support a contract. 
See, eg, Hale v. Brewster, 81 NM 342, 
467 P 2d 8,11 (1970) (court-appointed attor-
ney had duty to accept payment from court 
for representation as sole compensation; if 
client's note was given to attorney as fee 
for services attorney was already bound to 
perform and client had a valid defense to 
action by attorney on the note), Gragg v 
James, 452 P 2d 579, 587 (Okla 1969) (oral 
modification to contract relieving defen-
dant of responsibility must be supported by 
additional consideration to be enforceable), 
Walden v Backus, 81 Nev 634, 408 P 2d 
712, 714 (1965) (buyer's relinquishment of 
premises insufficient to support accord 
where buyer was already bound under sale 
agreement to return premises), Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts § 73 (1981) 
Therefore, we conclude that statutorily 
mandated assessment payments do not con-
stitute consideration sufficient to support a 
contract Plaintiffs' breach of contract 
claim fails as a matter of law. 
[4] Plaintiffs' statutory entitlement 
claim, which is also based on the alter ego 
theory, likewise fails. The statutory en-
titlement claim is based on Utah Code Ann 
§ 7-8a-8, which provides the amount of the 
guaranty of depositors' funds. That stat-
ute, however, cannot be read separately 
from section 7-8a-13(l), which requires a 
ratable reduction of depositors' recoveries 
by whatever deficiency there may be m the 
funds available to the guaranty corpora-
tion. Because the legislature established 
the liability of the ILGC under section 7-
8a-8 and then limited its liability under 
section 7-8a-13(l), plaintiffs cannot consist-
ently assert a claim of statutory entitle-
ment against the State based upon one 
statute while ignoring the other. Whether 
under the contract theory or the statutory 
entitlement theory, plaintiffs cannot recovi 
er more against the State as the alter ep 
of the ILGC than they could by suing th 
ILGC directly. 
[5] By itself, the statutory limitation of 
liability in section 7-8a-13(l) does not re-
sult m a dismissal of plaintiffs' claims 
There may be factual issues regarding the 
total funds available for the ILGC to dig-
tribute The appropriate place to resolve 
those issues, however, is m the separate 
proceeding liquidating the ILGC None-
theless, even if the statutory limitation of 
liability is not a reason for dismissal, plain-
tiffs' claims were properly dismissed 
[6] Even if a statutory entitlement 
claim exists against the State, an alter ego 
theory cannot be a basis for that claim. 
Section 7-8a-8, guaranteeing depositors' 
funds, was enacted by the legislature A 
claim based on that statute should be made 
directly agamst the State Although the 
ILGC may be a party to the action because 
of its status as an entity created by statute 
for the purpose of guaranteeing deposits, 
there is no reason to use the ILGC as a 
means of asserting an alter ego claim 
against the State. Because there is no 
valid contract claim and the statutory en* 
titlement claim cannot rest on the alter ego 
theory, it is unnecessary to determine 
whether the State can be held liable as the 
alter ego of a publicly created corporation. 
Plaintiffs' third claim for relief is based 
upon promissory estoppel. Plaintiffs seek 
to estop the State from denying representa-
tions and promises that led plaintiffs to 
believe that the obligations of the ILGC 
were guaranteed by the State. This court 
may uphold the trial court's dismissal of 
this cause of action if the complaint fails to 
allege the elements of a promissory estop-
pel claim or if, as a matter of law, estoppel 
may not be asserted against the State in 
this instance. 
[7] The elements of promissory estop-
pel are (1) a promise the promisor reason-
ably expects will induce reliance, (2) rea-
sonable reliance inducing action or fore" 
bearance by the promisee or a third person, 
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A (3) detriment to the promisee or a third 
on See Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 
Pun 1103 (Utah 1987); Sugarhouse Fin. 
JJ, i Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 
1080)' T^e a m e n (^ e^ complaint alleges that 
rn Weis and the DFI represented that the 
State backed up the guarantees, (2) these 
oresentations induced plaintiffs to ac-
Xe Foothill Financial, and (3) plaintiffs 
L t approximately $9 million as a result. 
That pleading sufficiently sets out the ele-
ments of promissory estoppel. We there-
fore turn to the issue of whether, as a 
matter of law, plaintiffs are precluded from 
asserting an estoppel claim against the 
State. 
[8] Utah recognizes the general rule 
precluding a party from asserting estoppel 
against the government. Utah State Uni-
versity v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 
(Utah 1982). This rule safeguards the in-
terests of the public which may be jeopar-
dized by the 'Vagaries oi political tides, 
frequent changes of public officials, the 
possibility of collusion, or of circumventing 
procedures set up by law, then suing for 
the value of goods furnished or services 
rendered." Id. Nonetheless, we recognize 
an exception to this general rule in unusual 
Circumstances "when it is plainly apparent 
that its application would result in injus-
tice, and there would be no substantial 
adverse effect on public policy " Id. 
The critical inquiry is "whether it appears 
that the facts may be found with such 
certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is 
of sufficient gravity, to invoke the excep-
tion." Id at 720. In Sutro, we allowed an 
estoppel claim against a government entity, 
but stated: 
In addressing the question whether un-
der any state of facts that may be found 
m this case the defense of estoppel may 
P* applied, there are some observations 
to be made. The first is that there is a 
distinction to be drawn between con-
tracts or activities which are either ma-
j™* in se, or which are strictly prohibit-
** h statute, and thus may be strongly 
gainst public policy, as compared to ac-
uities . . . which, though not authorized 
°y law, are not inherently evil In the 
-former class of cases, it is quite univer-
**% held that no estoppel will lie 
v. STATE Utah 769 
764 (Utah 1991) 
against the government, whereas in ac-
tivities which are merely ultra vires the 
courts are more likely to allow such a 
defense 
Id. at 719 (emphasis added). 
[9] In this case, the individual plaintiffs 
acquired Foothill Financial in a sophis-
ticated multi-million dollar purchase. They 
are chargeable with notice of the statutes 
governing the ILGC, particularly section 7-
8a-13(l), set out above, limiting the liability 
of the ILGC to its available funds, and 
section 7-8a-20(2), which provides: 
All advertising by any person with re-
gard to its membership in the guaranty 
corporation shall include the following 
statement: "Thrift certificates of deposit 
and thrift savings accounts protected up 
to a maximum of $15,000 by the Industri-
al Loan Guaranty Corporation of Utah, a 
private corporation which is not an in-
strumentality of the state of Utah or 
the Federal Government" 
(Emphasis added.) Any statements made 
by Weis or the DFI that the deposits would 
be unconditionally insured up to $15,000 
are in direct contravention of these statu-
tory limitations. Thus, plaintiffs do not 
allege a claim that comes within the Sutro 
exception to the rule that promissory estop-
pel may not be applied against the govern-
ment. This claim fails as a result. 
Plaintiffs do not allege any tortious con-
duct such as misrepresentation or negli-
gence by Weis or the DFI. They do not 
complain of any failure to warn Foothill 
Federated of the imperiled financial condi-
tion of the ILGC or that the DFI failed to 
discover or to be aware of the ILGC's 
condition. Rather, plaintiffs rely solely on 
an alleged contract with the State and/or 
on the assertion that the State is estopped 
from denying the existence of a contract. 
These claims are without merit, and we 
therefore affirm the trial court's dismissal 
of the complaint. 
HALL, CJ., HOWE, Associate CJ., and 
STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
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230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Kent L. Brown and Larry R. Hendricks, Plaintiffs/Appel-
lants v. Roy B. Moore; Elaine B. Weis; and The Department 
of Financial Institutions of Utah, Defendants/Appellees, 
Case No. 920703-CA 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Appellants Kent L. Brown ("Brown") and Larry R. Hendricks 
("Hendricks"), by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby 
object and respond to the letter dated February 26, 1993 by 
counsel for Appellees sent to the Court after oral argument (held 
February 17, 1993), purportedly to advise of new supplemental 
authority entitled Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991). 
OBJECTION TO CONSIDERATION OF APPELLEES1 SUBMISSION 
Brown and Hendricks object to consideration of the described 
submission of Appellees on the following grounds: 
1. The Prows case cited in the letter is not a decision 
which has only recently come to the attention of Appellees. 
Appellees argued in the district court in this action that the 
unpublished decision of the Third District Court in the Prows 
case was authority to support the position of Appellees. R. at 
267, 274.1 
1
 This was an improper argument at the time since it violated 
Rule 4-508 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration prohibiting 
references to unpublished opinions with no precedential value, as 
18749.HE624.1 
Mary T. Noonan, Esq, 
Clerk of the Court 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
March 4, 1993 
Page 2 
2. Counsel for Appellees in this case were also counsel for 
the State of Utah and the Department of Financial Institutions as 
parties in the Prows case. Since the Prows opinion of the Utah 
Supreme Court was released in early December of 1991, before the 
briefing began in this appeal presently before the Court, the Prows 
decision is not a matter which can properly be viewed as having 
only recently come to the attention of Appellees or their counsel. 
3. The Prows opinion was cited in Appellants' Reply Brief 
(at p. 12) for the limited purpose of providing background facts 
regarding certain aspects of the history of the situation presented 
here, only to rebut an unsupported assertion in Appellees' brief. 
Appellees had full opportunity to refer to the Prows opinion at 
oral argument, but chose not to do so. That decision does not 
now entitle Appellees to argue the case in a subsequent written 
submission to the Court. 
4. Appellees' complete and presumably intentional failure to 
even mention the Prows opinion in their principal brief, shows that 
Appellees' counsel recognized then that the Prows opinion has no 
application to this case. Not only are the relevant facts in Prows 
different and distinguishable from those in the present case, the 
legal theories upon which the two cases have proceeded are entirely 
different. 
5. To allow Appellees now to have the information in their 
letter of February 26, 1993 considered by this Court subverts the 
orderly process so carefully prescribed in the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and should not be countenanced. 
SUBSTANTIVE REPLY 
Should this Court decide to allow consideration of Appellees' 
letter of February 26, 1993, notwithstanding the procedural 
problems therewith described above, Appellants Brown and Hendricks 
respond substantively as follows: 
I. Prows is Distinguishable on Both its Facts and Legal Theories. 
As Appellees themselves partially acknowledge and concede in 
paragraph 2 of their February 26, 1993 letter, the Prows case is 
was then the case. 
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readily distinguished from the case at bar. In Prows., there 
apparently was no written contract between the State Department of 
Financial Institutions and Mr. Prows and Mr. Wood, the new owners 
of Foothill Thrift. 
In the present case, Appellants Brown and Hendricks entered 
into formal written contracts with both the Department of Financial 
Institutions ("DFI") and the Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation 
("ILGC"). Both contracts were specifically reviewed and approved 
by Defendant Weis as Commissioner of the DFI. Both contracts were 
premised on a written pro forma projection of the anticipated 
future performance of Western Heritage Thrift & Loan ("Western 
Heritage") under its new owners. In the Prows opinion, there is 
no reference to nor reliance on any such arrangement, which was 
missing in that case. 
In Prows, the Supreme Court held that the only contract there 
alleged, one between Foothill and the ILGC, was not based on any 
"bargain" made in that case, since the consideration from each 
party was provided only pursuant to statute. Prows, 822 P. 2d 
at 767-768. Further, the contract claim was not made by the 
individual plaintiffs, but rather by plaintiff Foothill Federated, 
which asserted that the ILGC was obligated only to guarantee 
"statutorily mandated levels" of insurance coverage for deposits. 
Id. By contrast, the contract claim of Brown and Hendricks does 
not seek enforcement of statutory obligations, and is based on a 
written agreement between them individually, on the one hand, and 
the DFI, on the other. 
In Prows, no constitutional or taking claim was alleged and 
the Court was not asked to examine the circumstances of any 
seizure which may have there occurred. Moreover, any such seizure 
occurred, if at all, under circumstances quite different from 
those of the present action. 
II. The Brown and Hendricks Contract was Based on Substantial 
Consideration, Not Statutory in Nature. 
Appellees, in suggesting in point (2) of their letter that the 
Brown and Hendricks contract may suffer a statutory consideration 
infirmity similar to the entirely different "contract" alleged in 
Prows, improperly construe and attempt to misapply the Prows 
holding. In the case at bar, Brown and Hendricks specifically 
bargained with the DFI to invest $550,000.00 of new capital and 
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personal management services in return for a reasonable opportunity 
to make Western Heritage sufficiently profitable so that they might 
make back their investment and more. This consideration was not 
statutory on either side. Brown and Hendricks were not obligated 
by statute to contribute anything to Western Heritage. Their 
decision to do so was induced by the implied promise of the DFI, 
inherent in the pro forma and written contract based thereon, to 
allow them to manage Western Heritage for a reasonable period of 
time. 
While Utah statutes gave Commissioner Weis the power to 
require the stock of Western Heritage to be transferred away 
from its prior owners, which was done in 1984, that statutory power 
was exercisable only because Western Heritage's prior owners had 
allowed it to become a failing financial institution. This did 
not depend on any conduct or consideration which originated with 
Brown and Hendricks. The statute did not obligate Commissioner 
Weis to transfer that stock to any new investor. She could and 
presumably would have kept that stock for the DFI in December 
1984 were it not for the new investment of capital, management 
experience and effort which Brown and Hendricks brought to the 
deal. This was reflected in Commissioner Weis' requiring the 
three-year future financial projections as a basis for the DFI's 
willingness to transfer the stock to Brown and Hendricks. 
Ill. The State's Taking Order Deprived Brown and Hendricks of any 
Legal Basis for Compensation in Liquidation Proceedings. 
The theoretical suggestion contained in point (3) of 
Appellees' letter of February 26, 1993 is a new argument, raised 
on appeal for the first time. It also ignores the fact that the 
ex parte taking order depriving Brown and Hendricks of all of their 
title to Western Heritage and its assets, leaves no legal basis for 
Brown and Hendricks to claim, as former owners, any right to any 
residual value which the liquidation proceedings might produce. 
Moreover, that taking and divestiture precluded Brown and 
Hendricks from any meaningful participation in the management of 
the liquidation proceedings. This exclusion makes it less likely 
for any excess recovery to be achieved by liquidators who are 
less familiar with the thrift's assets. In addition, the State 
consolidated the liquidation proceedings of many thrifts in such 
a way that any excess produced by Western Heritage goes to pay 
depositors of other thrifts, further lessening the likelihood 
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that there could ever be any excess available for Brown and 
Hendricks, even if they still had the right to seek such payment, 
because the other thrifts being liquidated with Western Heritage 
by the Appellees were much worse off financially than Western 
Heritage, This transfer of "surplus" collections only could be 
accomplished because of the taking of title to Western Heritage and 
its assets from Brown and Hendricks. 
Finally, the premise that underlies the unavailable remedy 
suggested by Appellees is that good and profitable management 
will be appropriately rewarded through a greater surplus while 
inadequate management will be penalized by its inability to 
generate a surplus. That premise supports the claims of Brown 
and Hendricks. 
Brown and Hendricks were recruited to step in and save a 
dying institution just moments before it would have otherwise 
taken its last breath, they provided new life blood for the thrift 
in the form of new capital contributions, were providing the best 
care and management possible for their patient, the thrift, and 
were significantly ahead of schedule in strengthening it and making 
it healthy when Appellees took Western Heritage. Appellees have 
misdiagnosed the problem created by Appellees and their proposed 
treatment is no cure. 
An original plus seven copies hereof are respectfully 
submitted this 4th day of March, 1993, and today I have sent a copy 
to Mr. Denton M. Hatch, and Mr. Bryce H. Pettey, counsel for 
Appellees, by first class mail. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
JKM/cas 
cc: Denton M. Hatch, Esq. 
Bryce H. Pettey, Esq. 
Kent L. Brown 
Larry R. Hendricks 
A3££k(ir H. N i e l s e n ~^~^  
Richard M. Hymas 
John K. Mangum 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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